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because it allows for consideration of other 
factors which serve to better protect the 
interests of society and of justice. Mdntyre, 
309 Md. at 622, 623, 526 A.2d at 37. (citing 
from Com fJ. Christmas, 502 Pa. 213, 465 
A.2d 989, 992 (1983». Applying this test, 
the court found that the defendant's "mere 
requests to see his mother, [under] the cir-
cumstances, [did not] factually constitute 
an invocation of his right to remain silent, 
"nor did it invoke his right to counsel." Id 
at 625, 526 A.2d at 39. 
There was a lengthy and strongly word-
ed dissent filed by Judge Adkins. The dis-
sent argued that even if a juvenile appears 
mature, etc., he cannot be held to unders-
tand the full ramifications of being 
arrested. Other jurisdictions provide safe-
guards for juveniles including a per se rule 
invalidating waivers, See, e.g., People fJ. Bur· 
ton, supra and special legislation, See, e.g. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§466-136 and 466-
137 (West 1987). (holding inadmissible 
confessions, statements or admissions 
made by a juvenile unless made in the pres-
ence of a parent or guardian) Mdntyre, 309 
Md. at 629, 526 A.2d at 40 (Adkins, J. dis-
senting). The dissent was adamant that 
Mdntyre's repeated requests for his mother 
should have been treated as a request for a 
lawyer. 
Furthermore, even by using the totality 
of the circumstances test, the state failed to 
show that Mdntyre had the necessary intel-
ligence, knowledge, maturity or any previ-
ous experience with the criminal justice 
system. 309 Md. at 635, 526 A.2d at 44. 
The court observed that Lodo'Wski dictates 
an adequate record is of utmost impor-
tance to determine if there was a constitu-
tional waiver or. rights. Id at 636, 526 A.2d 
at 44. Since the trial record was notably 
scant, the dissent urged that the conviction 
be reversed and a new trial be held. 
The court of appeals' ruling appears to 
be stating that when a juvenile is charged 
as an adult, he or she will be considered an 
adult even under the totality of the cir-
cumstances test. Also, the court will not 
consider age by itself, but will look to 
other outside factors in determining if a 
valid waiver of Miranda rights has been 
made. 
-Robert Feldman 
Booth v. Maryland: VICTIM IMPACT 
STATEMENTS INADMISSABLE AT 
SENTENCING HEARING IN 
CAPITAL MURDER CASE 
In Booth fJ. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529 
(1987), the Supreme Court of the United 
States in a 5-4 decision, delivered by Justice 
Powell, rejected the introduction of victim 
impact statements (VIS) at the sentencing 
phase of a capital murder trial. The Court 
reasoned that such information was irrele-
vant to the blameworthiness of a particular 
defendant and therefore violative of the 
eighth- amendment's prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. In rejecting 
the consideration of the VIS, the Court 
invalidated a Maryland statute to the 
extent that it mandated the compilation of 
a VIS in all felony cases. 
In Booth, the victims, Irvin and Rose 
Bronstein were robbed and brutally mur-
dered in their West Baltimore home by 
John Booth and Willie Reid. Booth, a 
neighbor of the elderly couple apparently 
entered the home to steal money in order 
to purchase heroin. Due to Booth's fear of 
identification by the victims, he and Reid 
gagged the Bronsteins and then stabbed 
them repeatedly with a kitchen knife. Two 
days later, the Bronsteins' son discovered 
the bodies of his murdered parents. 
A jury found Booth guilty of two counts 
of first-degree murder, two counts of rob-
bery and conspiracy to commit robbery. 
Prior to the sentencing phase of the trial, 
the State Division of Parole and Probation 
submitted a presentence report which 
described Booth's background, employ-
ment history, education, and criminal 
record. Pursuant to Md. Ann. Code art. 
41, § 4-609(c) (1986), the presentence 
report included a VIS, describing the 
detrimental effects of the crime on the vic-
tim's family and society in general. 
Defense counsel moved to suppress the 
VIS on the ground that it was "irrelevant 
and unduly inflammatory, and that there-
fore its use in a capital case violated the 
Eighth Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution." Booth. 107 S.Ct. at 2532. Denying 
the motion, the trial court submitted the 
information to the jury, who subsequently 
sentenced Booth to death. On automatic 
appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed both the conviction and the sen-
tencing decision. Booth fJ. State. 306 Md. 
172,507 A.2d 1098 (1986). The court, rely-
ing on Lodowski '0. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 
A.2d 1228 (1985) concluded that the VIS 
was not an arbitrary factor in the sentenc-
ing process, but rather an informative 
technique by which the sentencing body 
could measure the full extent of the harm 
caused by the perpetrator of the crime. 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Justice Powell distinguished between the 
use of a VIS in an ordinary civil or 
criminal case as opposed to the unique cir-
cumstance of a capital sentencing hearing. 
A VIS, in the vast majority of cases, pro-
vides the jury with two types of informa-
tion. Initially, it describes the personal 
characteristics of the victim and the emo-
tional impact of the crime(s) on the family. 
Secondly, it sets forth the family members' 
opinions and characterizations of the 
crimes and the defendant. Booth, 107 U.S. 
at 2533. In Booth, the VIS was based on 
interviews with the Bronsteins' son, 
daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter. 
The interviewer, an employee of the Divi-
sion of Parole and Probation, compiled the 
information, comments and reactions of 
the family and prepared a VIS which was 
then considered by the jury during their 
deliberation of Booth's sentence. 
The Court, in evaluating all plausible 
arguments as to the relevancy and effec-
tiveness of the VIS, discusses several poten-
tially unconstitutional results which 
illustrated the danger of allowing juries to 
consider this information. First, the Court 
noted that the function of the sentencing 
jury is to "express the conscience of the 
community on the ultimate question of 
life or death." Witherspoon 'V. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 510, 519 (1968). In so doing, the jury 
is required to focus on the particular defen-
dant as a "uniquely individual human 
bein[g]." Woodson fJ. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976). Applying this ration-
ale, the Court explained that "the focus of 
a VIS is not on the defendant, but on the 
character and reputation of the victim and 
the effect on his family. These factors may 
be wholly unrelated to the blamewor-
thiness of a particular defendant. Booth, 
107 S.Ct. at 2534. "Allowing the jury to 
rely on a VIS therefore could result in 
imposing the death sentence because of fac-
tors about which the defendant was 
unaware, and that were irrelevant to the 
decision to kilL" Id. Consequently, the 
Court found that the nature of the infor-
mation contained in a VIS created an 
impermissible risk that the capital sentenc-
ing decision would be made in an arbitrary 
manner. 
Secondly, the Court addressed the dan-
gers of imposing the death penalty based 
ont he ability of the family members to 
articulate their grief and the extent of their 
loss. U[I]n some cases the victim will not 
leave behind a family, or the family mem-
bers may be less articulate in describing 
their feelings even though their sense of 
loss is equally severe." Id. The fact that the 
imposition of the death penalty could turn 
on such unfair distinctions posed constitu-
tional problems for the Court. 
Finally, the Court examined the difficul-
ty of rebutting the implications of the VIS, 
without shifting the focus of the sentenc-
ing hearing away from the defendant. 
"Presumably the defendant would have 
the right to cross-examine the declarants, 
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but he rarely would be able to show that 
the family members have exaggerated the 
degree of sleeplessness, depression, or emo-
tional trauma suffered." Id. 
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, relied on 
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676 (1986) and 
concluded that "the amount of harm one 
causes does bear upon the extent of his per-
sonal responsibility." Booth, 107 S.Ct. at 
2542 (emphasis added). In Tison, two 
brothers who planned and assisted in their 
father's escape from prison were sentenced 
to death because in the course of their 
escape, their father murdered four inno-
cent poeple. Scalia's dissent pointed out 
that the difference between life and death 
for the two defendants was a matter 
"wholly unrelated to the[ir] blamewor-
thiness," yet they were held personally 
responsible for the degree of harm that 
they had caused. 
The impact of this decision is so poten-
tially far-reaching as to render the recent 
"victims rights" legislation virtually 
obsolete. Although Justice Powell speci-
fically distinguishes between the use of the 
VIS in capital sentencing hearings as 
opposed to noncapital cases, the distinc-
tion can hardly withstand the weakest 
attack on its logic. It remains to be seen 
just how far the Court will go in inter-
preting the effects of this decision, but the 
obvious implications suggest the begin-
nings of a new trend in "victims' rights." 
- Natasha Sethi 
u.s. v. Salerno: FEDERAL BAIL 
REFORM ACT DOES NOT 
CONTRAVENE U_S. 
CONSTITUTION 
In United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 
2095 (1987) the Supreme Court, as a mat-
ter of first impression, held that the 1984 
Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.c. § 3141 et seq., 
(" Act") does not, on its face, violate either 
the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment or the excessive bail clause of the 
eighth amendment. 
The Act authorizes the pretrial deten-
tion of arrestees who are charged with cer-
tain serious felonies and who are found, 
after an adversary hearing, to pose a threat 
to the safety of individuals or to the com-
munity. 
Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafero 
were arrested on March 21, 1986, on a 29 
count indictment alleging various Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire 
fraud offenses, extortion and various 
criminal gambling violations. 
At arraignment, the government moved 
to have the arrestees detained pursuant to 
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§ 3142. Section 3142 provides that an 
arrestee may be held without bail if no 
condition or combination of conditions 
would assure appearance at trial or assure 
the safety of another person or the com-
munity. The government claimed that no 
condition of release would assure the safe-
ty of any person or persons in the com-
munity. § 3142(e). The government 
proffered evidence which showed that 
Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese 
Crime family and that Cafero was a "cap-
tain" in the family. Evidence also showed 
that the two men had participated in wide 
ranging conspiracies and that Salerno per-
sonally participated in two murder con-
spiracies. 
The District Court granted the govern-
ment's motion finding that the govern-
ment met its burden of establishing by 
clear and convincing evidence that no con-
dition or combination of conditions of 
release would insure the safety of the com-
munity or any person. United States v. 
Salerno, 631 F.Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
Both Salerno and Cafero appealed. They 
contended that, to the extent the Act per-
mits pretrial detention on the ground that 
the arrestee is likely to commit future 
crimes, the Act is unconstitutional on its 
face. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit agreed. It concluded 
that a person could not be detained consis-
tent with due process merely because that 
person was thought to present a danger to 
the community. United States v. Salerno, 
794 F.2d 64 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Second 
Circuit reasoned that the system of 
government in the United States holds per-
sons accountable for past actions, and not 
anticipated future actions. The govern-
ment appealed. 
The Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist 
speaking for the majority, began by stating 
that because respondents had challenged 
the Act on its face, they bore the burden 
of showing that the Act could not pass 
constitutional muster under any set of cir-
cumstances. 
The fact that the Bail Reform Act 
might operate unconstitutionally 
under some conceivable set of cir-
cumstances is insufficient to render it 
wholly invalid... Schall v. Martin, 
[467 U.S. 253 (1984)]. 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct at 2100. 
The Court first addressed respondent's 
challenge (if the Act as violative of both 
substantive and procedural due process. 
"Substantive due process" prevents the 
government from engaging in conduct that 
"shocks the conscience," Roehm v. Cali· 
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), or inter-
feres with rights "implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937). United States 
v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101. 
Respondent's main contention under 
"substantive" due process was that the Act 
authorized impermissible punishment 
before any adjudication of guilt. The 
Court rejected this premise, stating that 
"[t]he mere fact that a person is detained 
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion 
that the government has imposed punish-
ment." Id. at 2121, quoting Bell v. WolfISh, 
441 U.S. 520, 532 (1979). 
In determining whether the detention is 
punitive or regulatory, the Court fashion-
ed the test " 'whether an alternative pur-
pose to which [the restriction] may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, 
and whether it ,appears excessive in rela-
tion to the alternativt purpose assigned [to 
it].' " Ibid., quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza· 
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963); 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101. 
Applying this test, the Court concluded 
that the detention imposed falls on the 
regulatory side of the dichotomy, thus no 
infringement of due process exists. 
The legislative history of the Bail Re-
form Act clearly indicates that Con-
gress did not formulate the pretrial 
detention provisions as punishment 
for dangerous individuals. See S. Rep. 
No. 98-225, p. 8. Congress instead per-
ceived pretrial detention as a potential 
solution to a pressing societal problem. 
Id. at 4-7. 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101. 
The Court re-enforced the conclusion 
that the Act was regulatory by focusing on 
the limited circumstances with which a 
person may be detained. Section 3142(F) 
allows for detention only in cases involv-
ing crimes of violence, offenses which the 
crime is life imprisonment or death, 
serious drug offenses, or repeat offenders. 
Furthermore, the Speedy Trial Act, 18 
U.S.c. §3161, remains in effect. United 
States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101. 
Also persuasive to the Court was the 
long line of decisions which upheld the 
government's authority to invade an indi-
vidual's interest in liberty. In each of those 
cases, the Court found the government's 
interest in detention compelling. In the 
instant case "[t]he government's interest in 
preventing crime by arrestees is both legiti-
mate and compelling." By enacting the 
Bail Reform Act, Congress made specific 
findings that individuals on bail awaiting 
trial "are far more likely to be responsible 
for dangerous acts in the community after 
